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Two recent articles in this Journal provide contradictory findings 
on the benefits of consumer information. Brenda J.  Cude tried a 
variety of measures of benefit, none of which appears as systematic 
as Scott Maynes’ distance from the efficiency frontier, but all of 
which suggest very large gains from better information. 
Experimental studies by Merle D. Faminow and Bruce L. Benson, 
on the other hand, suggest that posted prices lead to higher average 
prices and profits, presumably by allowing signalling among sellers 
and reducing their uncertainty.2 
I suggest that both findings are misleading if not incorrect. The 
experiments were in a duopoly framework where implicit collusion is 
relatively easy to induce and in a product area where margins are 
small anyway. Perhaps hidden-price-discounting sometimes persists 
more than advertised bargains, but experiments with a greater num- 
ber of sellers would be more persuasive. 
None of the Cude estimates of the benefits from best buys is so 
neatly quantitative as adding the departures from a Maynes effi- 
ciency frontier, since that might be thought of as the aggregate 
benefit. My problem is identifying from whence these benefits are to 
come. The average profit level in retailing is far below any of these 
estimates. Are there other monopoly rents that can be captured? 
Surely not in the rented space of the retailers, since other kinds of 
businesses compete for that space. Can one describe a process by 
which a new equilibrium is established with lower consumer prices? 
Does one drive out half the retailers and double the volume of the 
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rest with no increase in sales staff, since people need not shop so 
much? Can one estimate and include the savings to consumers who 
now do not need to shop around? Would a similar process eliminate 
some of the manufacturers, and lower the average costs and/or the 
profits of the rest? Would vast reductions in advertising also allow 
reductions in prices? If all these are true, the quantification of con- 
sumer benefits becomes far more difficult as it becomes more realis- 
tic. My own guess would be that the introduction of more informa- 
tion and/or better shopping by consumers would raise the best-buy 
prices, shifting the efficiency frontier, since the extra funds from un- 
informed buyers at non-sale periods would no longer subsidize the 
bargains to the smart shoppers. 
One is reminded of the use of retail-wholesale spreads in food 
prices as an indicator of exploitation of farmers and/or of con- 
sumers. One must ask from whence the potential gains are to come, 
and what the dynamic process would look like. If monopoly gains 
have been capitalized into space rents, stock prices, and even high 
wages in retailing, the process of eliminating them is likely to be cost- 
ly and distressing and sometimes to have unfortunate distributional 
(equity) implications. If, as I suspect, the gains to formerly careless 
shoppers are largely at the expense of formerly careful shoppers, 
would we applaud this? If the “careless” shoppers were poorer, 
harder-working (less time to shop), less educated, and more des- 
perate, then some benefits to them, even at the expense of the more 
fortunate, might be considered compassionate if not just. If we elim- 
inate a lot of jobs in retailing, what do we assume about alternatives 
for those workers in an area where unskilled or semi-skilled jobs are 
scarce anyway? We might applaud reductions in advertising ex- 
penses, in spite of some losses in subsidized television entertainment. 
My apologies for complicating matters, but we need to avoid the 
impression that consumer economists are, in the expressive language 
of Kenneth Boulding, “doing good badly.” 
